This article develops a research framework for the analysis of the politics of migration policy instruments. Policy instruments are seen as living instruments; they evolve and develop similar to moving targets. A scholar interested in this field of research may focus either on the establishment of a given instrument or on its use. The question of an instrument's design relates to the policy transfer literature focusing on how certain policies move from one setting to another. In the context of a policy transfer, actors from the other -'receiving' -institutional setting negotiate and, potentially, contest or reinterpret a policy instrument. The evolution of policy instruments once adopted in a specific institutional context is a second area of interest. The original goals can be diluted throughout the implementation process notably due to tensions between intergovernmental and supranational actors, or sticky institutionalization, which is characterized by path-dependencies. Often the choice of new instruments derives from an inefficiency or loss of credibility of past instruments. This editorial therefore seeks to make a twofold contribution: first it investigates the added-value of a policy instrument approach to the study of migration; second it furthers research on the external dimension of EU migration policy.
Introduction
The better 'governance' of international migration has become a priority for the EU. An important element in the EU's efforts to establish a common EU migration policy has been the strengthening of cooperation with third countries, in particular with migrant's countries of origin. Since the early 2000s, the EU has agreed upon a range of migration policy instruments with third countries such as the Mobility Partnership and readmission agreements. Although each of these instruments is usually structured similarly, they also exhibit substantial differences in terms of both content and practical use. A case in point is the Mobility Partnership with Morocco signed in June 2013 that gives Moroccan authorities more leeway in defining priorities compared to the EU's earlier Mobility Partnerships with Cape Verde, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia. The question therefore arises: which factors determine the design and use of EU migration policy instruments? By focusing on the politics of migration policy instruments, this Special Issue brings together a set of contributions that seek to shed light on this and related questions. A particular emphasis is placed on the role and impact of third countries and international organizations in defining and applying EU migration policy instruments. What is the direction of influence between the EU, third countries and international organizations? How do the EU's policy instruments in the migration field evolve in view of constant interactions with non-EU actors and institutions? These questions are relevant to the study of the governance of international migration at large given that policy instruments reflect wider norms that underpin such cooperation.
With this research focus, the Special Issue seeks to make a twofold contribution to the academic literature. A first objective is to investigate which kind of added value a policy instrument approach can offer to the study of migration. This approach has found increasing academic attention,1 yet its application has so far been limited to few policy areas such as environment2 and com-mon foreign and security policy.3 A second objective is to contribute to the better understanding of the evolving dynamics of the external dimension of EU migration policy. The establishment of this external dimension has been closely followed by political observers and the academic community.4 While building upon this knowledge, this Special Issue seeks to go one step further; it no longer focuses on the reasons why migration objectives found their way in EU external relations and/or 'contaminated' other policy areas such as development. Rather, it is interested in how migration policy instruments once established in EU external relations evolve over time and in constant interactions with third countries and international organizations. With only few exceptions,5 the EU's external migration cooperation has been analysed from a Eurocentric perspective, thereby neglecting the potential impact which non-EU actors may have on the evolution of an EU policy.
This introductory article is structured in three parts. It starts by analysing the different layers of migration governance (national/regional/international). The next and main section adapts the policy instrument approach for the purposes of the present research interest and clusters migration policy instruments in EU external relations. The editorial is concluded by situating the different contributions of the Special Issue in the politics of instrumentation.
The Different Layers of Migration Governance
The presentation of the different layers of migration governance is relevant as policy instruments often migrate between the layers (national/regional/international). In the case of the EU, for instance, many policy instruments have their origin either at the national or the international level.
2.1
The National Level Nation states have remained central actors in the governance of international migration. In many cases, migration-related arrangements are concluded only between a country of migrants' origin and a country of destination. Labour migration, in particular, has remained a field that is regulated in bilateral relations or in a unilateral form (meaning that migrant receiving states choose who they admit into their territory, with little or no influence from the migrant sending countries). In Europe, several states have been very active in signing bilateral agreements, in particular with migrants' sending countries in Africa. Important examples of bilateral partnerships have been Italy-Libya, FranceMali, France-Senegal, Denmark-Kenya and the UK-Tanzania.6 Linking migration-related issues to development aid and trade, these agreements have often sought to engage the migrant sending countries in the control of unwanted migration through readmission agreements and capacity building.
The national level has also been of high relevance for EU migration policy. At the beginning of the European cooperation, the EU level was not meant to take away decision-making competences from the national level. Cooperation was rather designed to shield an epistemic community (namely securityoriented actors from ministries of the interior of member states) from constraints exerted by constitutions, jurisprudence and laws at the national level. The EU provided these actors with 'venues of decision-making' in which they were protected from domestic and European actors with other preferences.7 Many policies adopted at EU level were of a restrictive nature and aimed at reducing the number of irregular migrants and (bogus) asylum seekers.8 With the gradual communitarisation of EU Justice and Home Affairs, the EU's role in immigration and asylum has been changing and other actors such as the European Commission or the European Parliament have gained influence.9 Still, member states and transgovernmental networks of law enforcement officials have remained particularly powerful in the process of externalizing EU migration policies.10
2.2
The Regional Level International migration management often takes place in a regional context, also due to the fact that migration flows exhibit regional patterns (e.g., Central American and Mexican migrants coming to the United States).
The wording 'regional context' can be understood in a twofold way. First, it can imply that countries within one region seek to find common responses to international migration challenges. This may involve the delegation of legal competences to a regional organization such as the European Union. In the case of the EU, this has happened with the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) which incorporated the Schengen rules and regulations into the EU's legislative framework and transferred immigration and asylum, along with visa, external border controls and civil law matters, from the intergovernmental 'Justice and Home Affairs' Pillar to the 'European Community' Pillar. With these new competences, the European Council quickly called for the development of 'a common EU asylum and migration policy' , including measures aimed at establishing a 'partnership' with countries of origin, ensuring fair treatment of third country nationals legally residing in the EU, creating common asylum procedures and rules and better controlling irregular migration.11 However, measures on legal migration did not feature high on this agenda given that the heads of state and governments had been reluctant to give away any decisionmaking power in this field. Until the Lisbon Treaty, decisions on legal migration required unanimity. While the EU is the regional organization with the farthest-reaching legal competences in the field, other regional entities such as the African Union (AU) or MERCOSUR in South America also increasingly deal with migration-related challenges. Their approach towards migration, however, may differ from the EU. The African Union, for instance, is less concerned with issues of irregular migration than with the well-being of the African Diaspora. Second, regional context can also imply that the governance of international migration increasingly takes place in trans-regional frameworks. 'Transregionalism' has become a prominent governance mode in relation to irregular migration and, to some extent, labor migration.12 In so doing, migrants' receiving states, in particular in Europe, the US and Australia, have stopped waiting (passively) until a migrant has reached the borders of their territory. 'Rather, they have increasingly sought to exert extra-territorial authority in order to shape the movement of people within or from other regions in the world' .13 Policy instruments and norms are sometimes the result of the influence of the transnational networks that may consist of NGOs or regional inter-state organizations such as the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). Of relevance have also been (loosely institutionalized) inter-state dialogues such as the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, the International Conference of Population and Development or the Global Forum on Migration and Development. They may end up or relate to regional consultative processes such as the Budapest Process, the Mediterranean Transit Dialogue, or the South American Conference on Migration.14
2.3
The International/Global Level 'Migration has become global but there is no global regime to govern the international movement of persons' . This statement by Philippe Fargues15 refers to the fact that there is no migration law that can be considered of global reach. The existing regime is complex, multilayered and consists of international, regional and trans-national treaties as well as bilateral arrangements.16 Although migration law has been codified to some extent at the international level, it has not been accompanied by a corresponding international architec-ture. According to Alexander Aleinikoff,17 there is 'substance without architecture' . This does not imply that international organizations (IO) have not dealt with migration-related issues. On the contrary, many IOs such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) have dealt exclusively or partially with aspects of migration governance. These organizations, however, have primarily provided their member states with services and advice. Regardless of the many international initiatives in the migration field, the willingness of nation states to subscribe to legally binding international norms has been limited. In Bett's analysis of global migration governance, multilateralism through international organizations is only a 'thin layer' . In several cases, however, migration issues are 'embedded' in the work of international organizations and/or in international norms, without being explicitly monitored by migration institutions.18
Two main narratives − 'migration management' and 'migration-development nexus' − dominate the global discourse and therefore norms and policy instruments. The first discourse concerns the need to manage or control migration fluxes, while the other insists upon the need to take into account the development roots and benefits of migration. It is interesting to note that the EU, in spite of its governance specificities, mirrors these discourses. Inspired by the New Public Management discourse, the 'migration management' view has been criticized for lacking an ethical dimension.19 The second narrative focuses more on the 'migration-development nexus' . A key assumption here is that the more targeted use of development aid and trade can contribute to reducing permanent migration.20 The potential of migrants has also moved to the centre of attention. Contrary to earlier discussions that assumed migration has a negative impact on the development of a country (in particular through 'brain drain'), a new consensus emerged in the 1990s highlighting the aspect of 'co-development' and the potential of the transnational engagement of migrants in the development of their home societies.21
Understanding EU Migration Policy Instruments
This section presents the analytical framework upon which the articles contributing to this Special Issue build. It starts by highlighting the benefits of a policy instrument approach to understand the dynamics of international migration governance. It then looks how these instruments are being diffused or developed within the context of EU migration policy and proposes a typology of migration policy instruments.
3.1
The Added-Value of a Policy Instrument Approach The policy instrument approach in public policy is tightly linked to the booming literature on new governance dealing with non-hierarchical, soft, and informal modes of policy-making. In the quest for 'better governance' , traditional policy instruments such as legislation, constitutions and regulations have been challenged by the need to accommodate a wider range of interests and stakeholders. The above-mentioned layers of international migration governance have multiplied the spaces, regions and arenas where policy instruments are designed, contested and implemented.
There are two strands of the literature for the study of policy instruments. The first one, borrowing from economics, adopts a rational-choice inspired analysis of policy instruments. It focuses on researching how instruments are able to efficiently reach their objectives, often relying on a cost-benefit analysis. It sees policy instruments as pragmatic tools to solve public policy issues at the functional disposal of policy-makers. Usually 'policy instruments are widely seen as being substitutable' and 'public policy is thus a toolbox from which the optimal tools are (or should be) selected' leading to the best possible outcome through an ideal 'policy mix' of instruments.22 This rational approach, however, does not focus on the 'politics' of instrumentation and the way instruments can be contested over time and evolve depending on the context. This is more the focus of a second strand of literature that sees policy instruments as 'a condensed form of knowledge about social control and ways of exercising it' .23 Far from being 'neutral devices' , they are contested and the object of dynamics of politicization, de-politicization and connected to issues of legitimacy. In this light, policy instruments are defined as 'a device that is both technical and social, that organizes specific social relations between the state and those it is addressed to, according to the representations and meanings it carries. It is a particular type of institution, a technical device with the generic purpose of carrying a concrete concept of the politics/society relationship and sustained by a concept of regulation' .24 A focus on the politics of instrumentation hence implies to look at the drivers behind the choices of instruments as well as the structure of a public policy. 25 This has been well demonstrated in the case of so-called EU 'new environmental policy instruments' (NEPI).26 NEPIs were introduced in the form of market-based instruments, voluntary agreements, and emission trading schemes to cope with weaknesses of traditional EU environmental policymaking (e.g., weak enforcement).27 While the innovative character of those new instruments is put forward, observers often neglect why specific instruments are adopted in specific situations or how they evolve over time.28 Often EU institutions borrow seemingly 'new' policy instruments from the national or international level in order to 'legitimise [their] environmental competence' .29 Halpern argues that NEPI were more useful in structuring the policy than achieving particular objectives. They were instrumental in providing specific groups with access to EU policy-making, addressing new issues and improving coordination. Information-based and consultative instruments have thus been useful in 'structuring forms of production of knowledge and expertise ' .30 Few studies have applied this research lens for other areas such as migration and EU external relations, let alone looked at the role of non-EU actors in the politics of instrumentation. An exception is the work of Menon and The 'third order change' , which should lead to a paradigmatic change, however, was not identified. The EU retained its core beliefs of normative power, and kept third countries somewhat excluded from the process. The studies applying the policy instrument approach so far have hence focused on the politics of instrumentation within the EU and on the EU as an actor or regionalism. The role and influence of external actors, e.g., if they mobilize against EU's policy instruments, are under-researched. Studies also often lack a dimension of temporality -how policy instrument evolve over time.34
3.2
Defining EU Migration Policy Instruments This Special Issue adheres to Lascoumes and Le Galès' understanding that policy instruments are not neutral but carry meanings about politics, knowledge and social control (see above). Therefore, a policy instrument has both an ideational and a functional dimension. The ideational dimension relates to the objectives and norms that underpin a given policy instrument. In this context, norms are understood as 'a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity' − basically what actors consider as normal or appropriate behaviour.35 The functional dimension concerns the way in which the actors seek to translate these objectives and norms into outcomes. In doing so, they first establish and then apply specific rules and technical tools. Let us exemplify this understanding of policy instruments for the case of EU readmission agreements. Such an agreement presents the legal codification of a concrete objective of EU migration policy -that is to establish a 'credible' EU migration policy that is 'capable of reacting in case of abuse' .36 These objectives are informed by wider societal norms and developments. In the literature, it is well-established that (and how) migration has become 'securitized' and transformed into a 'law-and-order' issue. This implies that migration has increasingly been framed as a threat to a country's social, economic and political stability.37 In the present case, therefore, the increasing relevance of a societal perception towards migration (migrants as 'security threats') has found its expression in the EU objective of 'fighting illegal migration' . This is to be achieved by signing EU readmission agreements with third countries. The very use of this legal device, however, not only depends on the way it was set-up (e.g., does the agreement include a 'third-country-national clause' or not?), but also on the ways in which the contracting parties employ it. A third country may contest an EU readmission agreement not only in the negotiation process but also in the implementation phase e.g., by systematically disapproving the certificates and documents provided by EU member states in the context of a return. This practical experience of cooperation feeds back into how the EU defines its policy objectives and instruments. In a long-term perspective, it may even impact the societal norms and objectives underpinning migration policy. The Special Issue therefore builds upon the understanding that policy instruments are living instruments; they evolve and develop similar to moving targets (Figure 1) . A researcher interested in policy instruments may focus While many of these research questions are addressed in the different contributions, they open up further and other avenues of research beyond this Special Issue. An intriguing aspect possibly addressed in further research is that some of the EU's policy instruments, often recently created, are hardly used by member states, which prefer to rely on existing bilateral instruments. For instance, the Commission complained in its evaluation of EU Readmission Agreements (EURA) that the 'inconsistent application of EURAs undermines greatly the credibility of the EU Readmission Policy towards the third countries, which are expected to apply the EURA correctly' .38 Similarly, at the level of operational cooperation, bilateral patrolling between the Spanish Guardia civil and the Moroccan gendarmerie or between the Italian Guardia di Finanza and the Libyan authorities might be privileged over a coordinated Frontex operation.
3.3
A Typology of EU Migration Policy Instruments A typology of migration policy instruments used in EU external relations includes agreement-and incentive based instruments, operational and practical support, and international law and norms development. It is important to highlight, however, that the boundaries between the different categories are at times quite blurry. When signing an EU readmission agreement, for instance, a third country often receives enhanced operational and financial support, as well as facilitated travel opportunities for its citizens.39 Immigration control agreements (or migration clauses in other EU agreements) are often linked to trade concessions and/or development aid. In many instances, this kind of arrangement is embedded into broader strategic frameworks of cooperation. 40 International law is a category on its own. The EU's objective of actively contributing to the development of international norms and principles in the area of asylum and migration is a relatively recent one, e.g., spelled out in the 2005 EU strategy for external action in JHA. 41 In practice, however, the EU and its member states are often more concerned with how to accommodate already existing international laws and principles within its national and European structures than with developing new ones.42 Table 1 shows that most of the EU's migration policy instruments build upon or are inspired by national or international forerunners. For instance, the historical roots of European readmission agreements lie in the early nineteenth century when Prussia first signed such agreements with other German States in 1818 and 1819.43 Circular migration schemes have been a long-standing instrument used by some member states before it found access to the EU's toolbox of policy instruments. Examples thereof include the Noria principle in France, the Gastarbeiter programme in Germany and other guest worker systems. 
The Politics of Instrumentation and the Special Issue
The politics of instrumentation differ according to which time-phase one analyses. Each of the contributions of this Special Issue focuses either on a policy instrument's inception or on its evolution. Given that many migration policy instruments migrate from one governance level to another, the question of an instrument's design relates to the policy transfer literature focusing on how certain policies move from one setting to another. Diffusion has been defined as 'the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among members of a social system' .45 Policy innovation and transfer may be actively promoted by external actors -yet it may also be the result of more unintended consequences or parallel developments e.g., between two regional organization such as Mercosur and the EU.46 Many of the EU's external effects are not necessarily intentional by nature but also stem from unintended side effects of the EU's internal regime. Sandra Lavenex and Emek Uçarer47 therefore introduce the term 'externalities' from economics for analysing the whole range of ways in which the EU impacts third countries and international organizations. They maintain that 'the external effects of European policies take place along a continuum that runs from voluntary to more constrained forms of adaptation, and include a variety of modes such as unilateral emulation, adaptation by externality, and policy transfer through conditionality' . 48 In the context of a policy transfer, actors from the other − 'receiving' − institutional setting negotiate and, potentially, contest or reinterpret a policy instrument. This process may alter both the instruments' ideational (meaning and rationale) and the functional dimension. From a theoretical perspective, actors' reactions to a policy instrument with a foreign origin may be best explained either according to a logic of appropriateness or according to a logic of consequentiality.49 According to the logic of consequentiality, the transfer of a policy instrument provides actors with new or enhanced opportunities to pursue their interests and to shift the balance of power in favour of their preference.50 A logic of appropriateness considers a wider normative environment in which actors behave and choose the policy option that is considered most legitimate.51 The pre-existing structures and local agents become key in negotiating and 'localizing' international norms and rules. This can even lead to a policy instrument's modifications 'in accordance with their preconstructed normative beliefs and practices' .52 Path dependencies, the structure of domestic institutions and pre-existing norms are hence of particular relevance for compliant or non-compliant behaviour.53 New policy instruments will 'never enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in a highly contested normative space where they must compete with other norms and perceptions of interest' .54
Inspired from these theoretical perspectives, Cassarino55 offers a telling account on how the Tunisian government selectively incorporated elements of the EU's migration policy toolbox in order to enhance its own strategic options with regard to surveillance and control. Whereas this example can be explained from a rational-choice perspective, a constructivist lens offers important insights in other instances. According to Wolff,56 the issue of appropriate behaviour has been of strong relevance in the EU's readmission negotiations with Turkey and Morocco. Acosta and Geddes57 show that the normative underpinnings of EU migration policy have been contested in the framework of the Mercusor cooperation. In fact, this contestation and opposition to EU migration norms has influenced the development of a more liberal approach towards migration in South America.
The evolution of policy instruments once adopted in a specific institutional context is a second area of interest. The politics of instrumentation of EU migration governance, especially with third countries, is a complex process. The original goals can be diluted throughout the implementation process notably due to tensions between intergovernmental and supranational actors, or sticky institutionalization, which is characterized by path-dependencies.58 Often the choice of new instruments derives from an inefficiency or loss of credibility of past instruments. This is true for the case of EU enlargement conditionality and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); it appeared at the beginning of the 1990s as a solution to new security challenges posed to Europe, in particular the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia, and also to restructure the relationship between the EU and NATO after the fall of the Berlin wall.59 However, eventually, the ESDP's goals and structure came to revolve mostly around civilian crisis management objectives. 'Similarly, there was never a strategic collective EU decision taken to use enlargement as a tool of security policy.
Rather conditionality emerged as a by-product of a highly contested process leading to the EU's eastern enlargement, in which different actors pursued competing objectives' .60 Thus, the purpose and structure of a specific instrument can be diluted throughout the policy-making process and may have different outcomes than those originally intended. In the field of migration policy instruments, such unintended consequences have been identified in the case of the Western Balkans.61 The increase of asylum applications originating from the Western Balkans was not foreseen by EU member states and made them revise their approach on how to grant (and maintain) visa-free travel. Finally, bilateral relations of member states as well as the international/ global level as discussed above may also turn out to be a constraint (or, on the contrary, an inspiration) for EU migration policy instruments. External actors and the intended recipients of those policy instruments exert another potential influence. With regard to the EU's instrument of mobility partnership, for instance, third countries such as Senegal and Cape Verde have not 'merely been passive recipients of policy proposals' but actively sought to influence the EU's policy outcomes. With their different empirical foci, the authors provide for detailed and rich insights into the politics of migration policy instruments and contribute to our understanding of this important aspect of EU external migration relations. Certainly, they cannot (and do not seek to) provide an answer to all the research questions identified in this editorial. The Special Issue understands itself as an endeavor to open up a new field of migration research, inviting other scholars to go in a similar direction and further deepen our knowledge.
